SOCIAL SCIENCES

PUBLIC LIBRARY
FEB 5 1957
DETROIT

20 Cents
February 9, 1957

NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

Timetable to Disaster

HENRY HAZLITT

The Dimensions of European Power

GERHART NIEMEYER

No Saltless Pumpkin

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Articles and Reviews by · · · · · · L. BRENT BOZELL
JAMES BURNHAM · WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR. · REVILO OLIVER
F. R. BUCKLEY · WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM · FRANK S. MEYER

NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

EDITOR and PUBLISHER: Wm. F. Buckley, Jr.

EDITORS

L. Brent Bozell — James Burnham
John Chamberlain — Willmoore Kendall
Suzanne La Follette — William S. Schlamm

PRODUCTION EDITOR: Mabel Wood

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT: Sam M. Jones

ASSOCIATES

Priscilla L. Buckley — Frank S. Meyer
Jonathan Mitchell — Morrie Ryskind

CONTRIBUTORS

C. D. Batchelor, John C. Caldwell, Frank Chodorov, John Abbot Clark, Forrest Davis, A. Derso, Max Eastman, Medford Evans, Karl Hess, John D. Kreuttner, J. B. Matthews, Gerhart Niemeyer, Revilo Oliver, E. Merrill Root, Freda Utley, Richard M. Weaver, Gen. Charles A. Willoughby

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTORS

Geneva: Wilhelm Roepke — *Madrid*: J. Dervin
Munich: E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn

BUSINESS MANAGER: Theodore A. Driscoll

ASSISTANT TO THE PUBLISHER: J. P. McFadden

Contents FEBRUARY 9, 1957 VOL. III, NO. 6

THE WEEK 122

ARTICLES

Mr. Burnham's Missing Sanctions — L. Brent Bozell 127
The Dimensions of European Power — Gerhart Niemeyer 129
Timetable to Disaster — Henry Hazlitt 133

DEPARTMENTS

For the Record 123
From Washington Straight — Sam M. Jones 131
The Third World War — James Burnham 132
The Printed Word — W. K. 136
Principles and Heresies — Frank S. Meyer 137
The Ivory Tower — Wm. F. Buckley, Jr. 138
Arts and Manners — William S. Schlamm 139
To the Editor 143

BOOKS IN REVIEW

No Saltless Pumpkin — John Chamberlain 140
King of Oberlin — Russell Kirk 141
Scalps and Poetry — F. R. Buckley 141
Grasshopper-Hero — Roger Becket 142
Of Psychic Powers — Revilo Oliver 142

NATIONAL REVIEW is published weekly, except second and third weeks in August, at Orange, Conn., by National Weekly, Inc. Copyrighted 1957 in the U.S.A. by National Weekly, Inc. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Orange, Conn.

EDITORIAL AND SUBSCRIPTION OFFICES:
211 East 37th St.
New York 16, N.Y.
Telephone: MUrray Hill 2-0941

RATES, Twenty cents a copy, $7.00 a year, $13.00 for two years. Foreign, $9.00 a year; Canada, $8.00 a year.

The editors cannot be responsible for unsolicited manuscripts unless return postage, or better, a stamped self-addressed envelope is enclosed. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors.

The WEEK

● Mr. Dulles now says that "nothing would so irreparably damage the relations" between the United States and her Western allies as a congressional investigation of Middle Eastern policy. Why? Because that policy is ignoble? If so, let us change the policy. —Or is it because we *have* no policy; in which case let us get one, and if the Administration can't think one up, perhaps Congress can help it along?

● Just a fortnight ago the eternal optimists were saying that a solid pro-Gomulka turnout in the Polish election would discourage the Stalinists from attempting to re-establish total control. But the optimists have, as usual, proved unrealistic. The flush on Gomulka's cheek brought on by his dizzy electoral triumph had barely subsided when the Natolin (Stalinist) group in the Central Committee formally labeled the Gomulka agricultural program "a step back towards capitalism"—an accusation tantamount to a bill of treason. Though the Stalinists may not be able to make the accusation stick at the February meeting of the Central Committee, the pressure on Gomulka mounts. Ulbricht's East German Communists, Stalinists all, are now threatening that if Gomulka's "liberalization" is not stopped, the Oder-Neisse boundaries must be revised. Whether Gomulka remains or goes, the moral is the same: to appease Communism in the hope of getting a "milder" brand leads precisely nowhere. The way to strike against Communism is to strike.

● Heaven only knows what Jack Sobol, Myra Sobol, and Jacob Albam have done to this country, in return for its hospitality to them. The details of the havoc they presumably caused are not public. Did they reroute a few pounds of U-235 to the Soviet Union? Or secure technical details on our latest guided missile? Or advise the enemy on how to break our most recent code? Or only infiltrate the *New York Times*? (Not that last, we hope, because then no one will be able to mention it without infringing upon freedom of the press.)

● Nehru still has a few tricks to learn from the Kremlin, but as a mimic he is doing pretty well. On January 26 New Delhi made a formal announcement of "the accession" of the state of Kashmir to India. By what right? Exactly the same right as that by which the Soviet Union took direct control of Hun-

gary: the right of armed might. The parallel is detailed. Indian troops hold the greater part of Kashmir. Everyone knows that the predominantly Moslem Kashmiri would vote for union with Pakistan, if given a chance. UN resolutions—accepted by Pakistan and defied by India—have repeatedly called for a plebiscite under international supervision. In November (as Soviet troops smashed into Budapest), Nehru staged a fake Kashmir "constituent assembly" which dutifully voted to join India. Krishna Menon, *à la* Shepilov, gave a ranting 7 hr. 48 min. speech to the UN Assembly. And the very next day Nehru proclaimed the *fait accompli.*

● The farm bloc, Senators Young and Langer in the fore, have introduced a new bill similar to but a bit more extreme than the one vetoed by the President last year. It would establish a permanent 90 per cent parity for cotton, corn, rice and peanuts, and a 75 to 95 per cent range for wheat. The net result would be another billion or so in government subsidies, and an agricultural surplus mounting without limit. And it could make farming the best gamble in history: if anything grows on your land, the parity mechanism pays you; if nothing grows, you get paid through the Soil Bank.

● Henry George Strauss, first Baron Conesford of Chelsea, Conservative Member of Parliament, maintains that on top of everything else England is losing her most precious patrimony, the King's English, and this due to the ravages upon it by Americans of "pretentious illiteracy." Lord Conesford singled out a number of examples of that illiteracy, and climaxed his peroration by saying, "What would have been the result if Sir Winston Churchill instead of saying, 'Give us the tools and we will finish the job,' had said, 'Give us the implements and we shall finalize the solution of the matter'?" We dunno. But here's one for Milord: What would have been the result if Americans had taken Sir Winston at his word?

● Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr has written for the American Federation of Labor's *The Federalist* an article on right-to-work laws. It is a remarkable piece, not so much for the analysis it makes or arguments it marshals against these laws as for the exhibition of a dismaying coarseness of mind and spirit in its author. Dr. Niebuhr goes so far as to assert that "the implausibility of the so-called 'right-to-work' laws is so obvious that one must come to the conclusion that their proponents are either stupid or dishonest in their pretensions." The descent to this kind of argument—the argument by massive affirmation linked to a Lidice-like assault upon the *bona fides* of the opposition—is the shame and, increasingly, the trademark of Liberal publicists.

● Mr. Franz Pick, the well-known foreign exchange analyst, has just issued a report on movements of Soviet bloc currencies during the past few months. With one exception, all the currencies have dropped sharply in free market value. The Hungarian forint, for example, has skidded from 50 per dollar (2¢) last July down to 150 (2/3¢); the Polish zloty from 76 to 120; and the Russian ruble itself from 19 to 27.5. The Czech koruna, Rumanian leu and Bulgarian lev have also dropped, but less than the ruble. The Red Chinese yuan, in significant contrast, has remained firm at last summer's rate of 5.15 per dollar. Changes in currency conversion values, it should be noted,

For the Record

Thad Hutcheson is the only GOP candidate in a seven-man field in the Texas Senatorial elections now definitely scheduled for April 2. Hutcheson is opposed, among others, by Ralph Yarborough and Representative-at-large Martin Dies. . . . Four Liberal Republican Senators are sparking the move to amend the McCarran-Walter Immigration Law. They are Senators Ives and Javits of New York and Case and Smith of New Jersey. . . . The heretofore strongly anti-Communist Polish-American community is swinging toward a position of partial support of U. S. aid to the Gomulka regime, or so say Congressmen elected from predominantly Polish districts. . . Of the 24 Chinese nationalists now held in U. S. jails on criminal convictions, only one accepted the government's offer of repatriation to Red China. . . . The Peiping regime has refused to allow the lawyer for John and Sylvia Powell to enter North Korea or Communist China unless his passport is validated by the State Department—an attempt to force recognition of Communist China by the United States. The Powells, who edited the *China Monthly Review* in Shanghai during the Korean War, will be tried on sedition charges. . . . The loud protests from Belgrade over unfriendly reaction in this country to Marshal Tito's proposed visit are similar to those issued before his trip to Great Britain in 1953. . . . The Library Committee of the Society of Friends in Plymouth Meeting has responded to the contempt conviction of librarian Mary Knowles for refusal to answer questions about alleged Communist associations by raising her salary. . . . The Abraham Lincoln National Republican Club will hold a day-long rally February 9 at the Sheraton Hotel in Chicago, on the theme: "Real Republicanism *vs.* modern Republicanism." Speakers will be Senators McCarthy and Jenner, former Senator Welker of Idaho and former Governor J. Bracken Lee of Utah. . . . Address inquiries to 603 E. South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.

express the free market estimate of the relative soundness and stability of the given country's economic and fiscal condition.

● In a by-election to fill a vacancy in the French Assembly—the first major electoral test since the Suez and Hungarian events—a conservative won an absolute majority over the combined votes of four opponents. Pierre Poujade, facing the voters for the first time, ran so far behind that he and "Poujadism" are probably on their way out of French politics. The Communist vote dropped more than 40 per cent from a year ago in the same district. Because at least part of this loss was due to absentions, it is not yet clear whether any of the other parties will prove able to win over the disillusioned Communist supporters.

● New York City wants to sell its three city-owned power plants (two of which are obsolescent). The Consolidated Edison Company wants to buy. Consolidated has made an offer. The city thinks the price is right. It's a deal, then? Not if the Transport Workers Union can stop it. It seems the employees are now paying their monthly tribute to TWU under a blanket contract with the city. If ownership switches to Consolidated, the electrical workers union will claim the prize. That, surely, is unconstitutional and maybe even un-American. Certainly sufficient cause to call off the whole thing and let the taxpayers continue to supply the deficit.

● NATIONAL REVIEW is *against* euthanasia, and still against it when they call it mercy-killing and put the word "voluntary" in front of it—as did the 166 New Jersey physicians who recently petitioned their state legislature to legalize it. And this time we have a ready answer to the question, "What are you *for?*" Namely, an official rebuke of all 166 for holding opinions impossible to square with the oldest and finest of professional oaths.

● "Plows," said Comrade Wang Singh Lee, "are what we need, one million plows to work the fertile lands of China." "One million!" scoffed Comrade Tong. "What we need is *five* million—of the biggest double-wheeled and double-bladed plows our factories can turn out"; and for his super-Stakhanovite enthusiasm was promptly awarded the coveted Order of Mao. And so Chinese factories started busily beating out their plowshares until one and one-half million shiny plows were completed. But, alas, what Planners Lee and Tong had overlooked was that the plows they designed were too big for the small and muddy rice paddies of South China, and too heavy for a single animal to drag. In fact, one million of them lie today in the fields of China, rusting away, a monument to the enthusiasm of the late Comrades Lee and Tong, of revered memory.

● There was a day when a coy smile, a deft tongue, or a strategic tear would so effectively undermine the resolution of a Roman *poliziotto* that he would end up apologizing for the inconvenience caused, and waving the offending motorist on with effusive gestures of chivalry. But that was in the old days—the good old days, we almost said, out of habit. Last year 750,000 persons—roughly one third the population of Rome—were arrested and fined 250 lira each for miscellaneous traffic offenses. The massacre followed upon the enactment of an ordinance assigning the arresting officer one third of the fine collected. There goes that old devil profit motive again!

Exploiting the Verities

Mayor Wagner did not do King Saud an injustice in the sense of attributing to him views he does not hold. Saud *is* anti-Jewish and anti-Christian and pro-slavery; he is also anti-alcohol and pro-polygamy and a good many other things that range from the distasteful to the horrifying. He belongs, let us face it, to another race, another religion, another civilization, another country, true to whose traditions and precepts, religious, political and anthropological, he lives and reigns.

Perhaps men should consistently be judged against our own standards, always and in every circumstance. That view can cogently be put forward by thoughtful men. It is regrettable, though, when a politican not given to dealing in philosophical niceties rides in on the coattails of the eternal verities to score a cheap political advantage. The odds are that if the visitor in question had been anti-Christian, pro-slavery, anti-alcohol, pro-polygamy—and pro-Zionist, Mr. Wagner, seeing his duty to international peace and harmony and understanding, would have given His Majesty Saud ibn Abd Al-Aziz Al-saud the keys to the Greatest City in the World.

Minimum—Not Uniform

Governor Harriman recently declared that that part of the Taft-Hartley Law which countenances right-to-work laws (as also, presumably, that part of any law that sanctions the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution) should be repealed on the grounds that right-to-work laws "invite competition among the states in low wages for labor."

Is there not to be competition in the cost of labor? Isn't competition in the cost of labor the basis of a competitive economy given the fact that the cost

of labor is in almost every case the largest item in the cost of production? It is reasonably held that in those extraordinary situations when the competitive market place prescribes for labor a submarginal wage, the market place should be overruled, and an arbitrary floor imposed beneath which compensation may not fall. But when that happens we have left the world of economics for that of humanitarianism; and the argument properly arises, Who is the logical dispenser of humanitarianism, the people or the state?

Be that as it may, the statists, on the assumption that the responsibility is the government's, enacted a law which attempts to fix the level below which wages are inadequate. But the Minimum Wage Law was not designed to do away with competition between individual laborers, or between laborers in different towns, states, and regions: and any effort to prevent such competition by federal prescriptions is an effort to abandon the competitive economy.

Do you suppose anyone ever explained that to Governor Harriman?

Clarification, Please

We have wrestled with the full text of Mr. Henry Ford's address before the National Automobile Dealers Association with a determination we have not brought to any piece of prose since we attempted to decipher Cicero. Alas, for Mr. Ford there is no trot which we can furtively consult in order to be able to say, with assurance, Here is what he is saying.

Mr. Ford begins by saying we are losing out to the Soviet Union in our bid for allegiance on the part of the uncommitted nations. That is true. And that we should do something about it; and that, too, is true.

What? Well, we need "a more realistic and unemotional approach to foreign aid." (True.) Moreover, "we should get rid of the childish notion that we are out to buy love or friendship." (True.) "We've got to get out ahead of events and try to lead and shape them to the best of our ability." (True.)

What, specifically? "Basically, we must accept the challenge by devising realistic and long-term programs of trade and aid. . . ." Different from what we have been doing in what sense?—

"I think we've got to take a new look at our relations with the Communist satellites. Thus far, we have tended to apply economic sanctions in the form of drastic trade limitations and laws which largely prohibit us from offering them economic help. . . . But it appears that our policies have tended to play right into the Kremlin's hands to the extent that they make the satellites more dependent on Moscow. I think we need to be realistic and decide whether our trade-and-aid policies toward such satellite areas as Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and even Red China are really in our own best interests. Maybe the people of Red China are just as anxious to get rid of the yoke of Communism as the Hungarians have demonstrated they were. Shouldn't we give them a chance—or at least some alternative to their present ties with the Kremlin?"

The compressed confusion of that passage, which embodies clichés, truths, fallacies, and non sequiturs, leaves one asking, What is Henry Ford proposing? The headline writers see him calling for trade with Red China, and that inference is reasonable: but so are others, contradictory ones.

Let us reiterate this: American aid should be geared to the national interest. The national interest demands the strangulation of the Communist world. Communism's principal physical weakness is its economy. We have been losing to the Soviet world not because we have imposed sanctions against it but because we have not imposed sufficient sanctions against it, with sufficient singlemindedness and force. The surest means of giving the satellite countries a "chance" to "get rid of the yoke of Communism" is to renounce the policy of coexistence, and adopt one of liberation. If Mr. Ford wants confirmation of this, he should consult with refugees from the satellite world.

Freedom to Think Irresponsibly

The notion has often been implied in letters to NATIONAL REVIEW about our solicitation of undergraduate essays on classroom indoctrination. It is, therefore, high time some authoritative verbalizer came right out and said it—as Professor Talcott Parsons of Harvard at last did, a few weeks ago, in a speech at Brown University.

Classroom speech, Professor Parsons asserted, should be declared "privileged communication"— that is, should be put in the same category as conversation between lawyer and client, and doctor and patient.

We are glad it was Professor Parsons, not someone else. As a member of the National Council of the American Association of University Professors, he speaks with authority; and as the author of a whole series of sociological treatises whose tendency is to deprive religion, morality and honor of all objective meaning, he verbalizes well and, in the very act, exposes the intellectual ancestry of all such thinking about the professorial function. As witness his further remark: "The professor must be free to think out loud, to play with ideas, in a sense, to think irresponsibly—irresponsibly relative to the responsibility with which he would produce a work intended for publication." Leave the professor free, in other words, to use the classroom for intellectual libertinage without fear of exposure, and let his published writings serve as evidence of his "impartiality" and "detachment."



Policing Our Freedoms

The new and excellent history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Don Whitehead records an interesting memorandum, sent by J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Biddle, on the subject of the mass evacuation of Japanese from California in 1942. "The necessity [Mr. Hoover wrote] for mass evacuation is based upon public and political pressure rather than on factual data. Public hysteria and, in some instances, the comments of the press and radio announcers, have resulted in a tremendous amount of pressure being brought to bear on Governor Olsen [of California] and Earl Warren, Attorney General of the State, and on the military authorities."

The deportation in question is among the blackest marks in the history of civil liberties in this country. It is interesting that, in 1942, the man most commonly denounced as indifferent to civil liberties was, in a memorandum to his boss, the patron saint of civil liberties, doing his unsuccessful best to persuade him —and another great friend of civil liberties, now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court—to slow down and have a look at what he was doing. To no avail. One must, however, bear in mind that it was suspected Fascists Biddle and Warren were going after, not suspected Communists. In going after the former, the rules change, as everyone should know.

Euclidian Esthetics

The logic is irrefragable: the shortest distance between two points is a straight line between them. If you need to move traffic from Point A to Point B, you build a road leading directly from the one to the other. And if the road happens to pass over ground as hallowed and beautiful as Christ Church Meadows, then so much the worse for Christ Church Meadows —and for adjectives like hallowed and beautiful.

Irrefragable, yes, but recognizably bureaucratic. So we pay tribute to those true British conservatives, of all parties, who have kicked up something just short of a civil war in an attempt to save the Meadows even if it means a longer road, by a mile or two. Such a road would run over the dead body of the Minister of Transport, who has said, "I do not build roads for private motorists. That is not my job. Road-building for pleasure motoring may come one day, but not out of the money I have to spend. The motorist will get no sympathy from me." Nor the Meadows, nor the fogs that traditionally caress their contours, nor anything save, one suspects, the Black Marias of the emergent police state.

The Foot-in-Mouth Disease

One of the more dismaying things about the modern world is the increasing inability of supposedly intelligent people to know what they are saying. Here we have Don Ferguson, President of the Australian Lawn Tennis Association, objecting to professional tennis not because of what it may be doing to undermine the ideals of amateur sportsmanship but because it is *killing the amateur gate*. Just think of it, says Mr. Ferguson, the recent professional match between Rosewall and Gonzales at the Kooyong Stadium grossed $60,000 which might have been had by amateur associations if only they had found a way of killing professionalism!

Mr. Ferguson is obviously unaware that he has effectively defined an amateur tennis player as one who plays for money but doesn't get it, which would seem to make the amateur different from the professional only in the matter of gullibility. Nor does Mr. Ferguson realize that he has inferentially described his fellow tennis hierarchs in terms that might bring a blush to the cheeks of Pandar. If this inability to relate words to their actual content were an isolated instance, it would merely stand as one more amusing contribution to the gaiety of nations. Unfortunately, in a world which regards the UN as a symbol of power and which sees no hint of inflation in seventy-billion-dollar budgets, Mr. Ferguson's break is symptomatic of an all-too-prevalent disease.

Mr. Burnham's Missing Sanctions

In two further comments on the proposal that Central Europe be neutralized, Mr. Bozell dissents while Dr. Niemeyer weighs the risks involved . . .

L. BRENT BOZELL

As I read his recent foreign policy proposals, James Burnham is asking us to adopt three basic changes in our thinking about foreign policy: 1) that we henceforth accommodate our views on World War III strategy to the value axioms of the Liberal Establishment; 2) that we regard withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe as the number one objective of U.S. strategy; 3) that we regard Titoism as, in and of itself, "a step toward liberation." If we go along with him thus far, Mr. Burnham is saying, we can deal sympathetically with his concrete proposal: that the U.S., in exchange for Soviet troop withdrawal, agree to the reunification of Germany as a neutral, demilitarized state. Let us, therefore, simply posit, as I believe Mr. Burnham does, that Germany is an asset of *some* strategic value to the West (I would add: a moral responsibility), and proceed to examine the three propositions on the strength of which Mr. Burnham would have the free world relinquish whatever stake it has in Germany.

1. Having remarked in his column, "The Third World War" (NATIONAL REVIEW, Dec. 29), that an ultimatum to the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from the satellite area is precluded by the prevailing value axioms, Mr. Burnham, in his next paragraph, makes a further, and as I interpret it, very different contention, viz: "Let us, however, *ourselves* renounce the ultimatum or any comparable move with immediate military implications. [For] the West's liberal-humanitarian abstractions are themselves part of the reality of our time, just as much as geography, manpower and armament potential." (My emphasis.) Here I read Mr. Burnham to be saying much more than that any strategy we are likely to get will perforce have to conform with the value axioms of the Liberal Establishment: he appears to be exhorting us, *en famille,* to adopt those axioms for working purposes as our very own —to stop racking our brains over the strategy that *might* be pursued if the nation were ruled by a different set of value axioms.

But this is to ask capitulation, it seems to me, in the one area in which capitulation is unthinkable. For the business of conservative Americans, as I understand it, is precisely to weigh the prevailing value axioms, and, if they are found lacking, to challenge them, and urge the acceptance of others. NATIONAL REVIEW is not the War College. There is no harm in dispatching occasional memoranda to U.S. strategy planners, suggesting how they might better operate within the limitations of the ruling axioms, but I cannot agree that this should now become the main concern of men dedicated to removing those limitations. And especially not when the limitations (imposed by the doctrine that war is too horrendous to risk) imply ultimate surrender.

Our task is not as hopeless as Mr. Burnham implies. The ruling axioms are *not* fixtures, in a class with geography, and manpower potential. They are value judgments, as susceptible of change as the minds of the men who adopt them. As long as communications are open, the possibility of change remains—a possibility that has always been the brighter for Mr. Burnham's labors in its behalf.

If Soviet Troops Withdrew

2. Mr. Burnham urges us to devote single-minded attention to getting Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe. "All else," he writes, "should now be secondary." This objective has never before been considered particularly important by hard anti-Communists—or, for that matter, by soft ones. For it has been generally assumed a) that national police forces would be able to keep down the satellite populations if Soviet troops were to go home, and b) that if national police forces failed in their mission, Soviet troops could and would move back in.

Therefore, while we desired withdrawal on the grounds it might *conceivably* improve the prospects of successful revolution, we were emphatically unwilling to bargain off strategic advantages now possessed by the West in order to obtain a withdrawal. Concretely: anti-Communists have supported the Eisenhower Administration's refusal to consider Soviet proposals for a mutual withdrawal of troops—proposals that differ from the Burnham Plan, let it be noted, only in the extent of suggested American withdrawal. Now: has anything happened that requires us to revise our previous estimate?

The Hungarian revolution certainly damaged the assumption that native Communist police forces are capable of preventing general uprisings in the satellites. No one anticipated large-scale defection in Hungarian regular army units and the AVH, nor that great numbers of ordinary citizens would challenge tanks. The fact proved us wrong. But it does not follow that because the assumption was invalid *before* the revolution, it is therefore invalid now. For the Hungarian revolution also produced the facts that when Communist rule in a satellite nation was endangered, Soviet troops intervened and Western troops did not; and this additional fact: that the revolution *failed.* Consequently, we must rate the chances of a satellite people's mustering sufficient nerve to defy their national Communist rulers *lower* than they actually were (whether we knew it or not) before Hungary—perhaps low enough to warrant revival of the assumption that national Communist governments can retain power without the aid of the Soviet Army.

Be that as it may, our second assumption—that Soviet troops will return if national police forces cannot handle anti-Communist revolts without them—is damaged not at all by the events in Hungary. Quite the contrary. Now then, does the Burnham Plan deal with the problem of re-entry? How, given the withdrawal of Western and Russian troops from Central and Eastern Europe, does Mr. Burnham propose to enforce the bargain?

Mr. Schlamm, in his article on the subject (NATIONAL REVIEW, Jan. 26), attributes to Mr. Burnham the position that the United States should regard any recrossing by Soviet troops of the 1939 Russian western frontier as a *casus belli* and should forthwith launch atomic war. For what else, Mr. Schlamm seems to be saying, *could* Mr. Burnham mean? I am not sure what Mr. Burnham means; but I find nothing in his writings about his plan to suggest he means *that*. Nor, given Mr. Burnham's demonstrated devotion to consistency in argument, would I expect to.

The one, the only reference to the problem of enforcement in Mr. Burnham's various discussions of his plan appears in this passage: "But how could these steps be taken," he asks, "granted the Western decision against a direct risk of war? Fortunately, an actual test suggests the answer: by applying and generalizing 'the Austrian formula.' That is, by the military neutralization of Central and Eastern Europe, including all Germany: withdrawing therefrom all Western along with all Soviet occupation troops, *guaranteeing against their re-entry*, and restricting the nations of the area to police and defensive armament." (My emphasis.) This, then, is the enforcement provision: a "guarantee" against Soviet reoccupation of Eastern Europe, under "the Austrian formula." Very well; but the Austrian Treaty provides merely that the signatories will "respect the territorial integrity and independence of 'Austria." So that the Burnham Plan's "guarantee," via projection of "the Austrian formula," turns out to be a naked promise by the Soviet Union to honor the withdrawal agreement. That is all.

And that, of course, is all Mr. Burnham can give us. *"Granted,"* he says by way of preamble to his proposals, *"the Western decision against a direct risk of war"*; but by granting that much he automatically excludes meaningful enforcement measures such as a formal U.S. commitment to defend Eastern European countries against a Soviet invasion, and a subsequent U.S. decision to honor that undertaking by launching World War III. In other words, having adopted the "Eisenhower axioms," Mr. Burnham is stuck with them.

But quite aside from Mr. Burnham's dialectical obstacle: as long as the "Eisenhower axioms" prevail, the U.S. is *not* going to risk war with the Soviet Union on behalf of Polish independence—whether by an ultimatum to the Soviets to get out of Polish territory or by a solemn undertaking to fight them if they return. Which is exactly why we must regard a successful fight against the "Eisenhower axioms" as a *sine qua non*. And it makes no sense, while fighting that battle, to condone a sacrifice of our strategic assets that will find the free world weaker on the happy day, if it comes, when the axioms are no longer with us.

Perhaps, however, Mr. Burnham is saying this: that external sanctions *are not needed* to keep Soviet troops behind the 1939 frontier; that inasmuch as the Soviet Union needs to "shorten its lines" and repair its "badly cracked internal structure," it will *want* to respect the withdrawal agreement; not only that—it will want to so badly that it will permit Communist rule in Eastern Europe to disintegrate, whether by revolution or evolution, even though it knows it can prevent that disintegration without serious risk of war with the West! If that is the argument, I should want a) some evidence that the Soviet Union is in *that* kind of trouble; and b) an explanation of why, if the Soviets *are* that anxious to withdraw and stay withdrawn, the West should pay a price to get them to do it.

Titoism

3. Mr. Burnham is optimistic, even enthusiastic about Titoist tendencies in Eastern Europe, and much of his thinking seems to proceed from that judgment. His case for Titoism rests on this proposition: "Within any nation," he writes, "any change that weakens the control of Moscow and any step that loosens the Communist social structure is a step toward liberation." The proposition, at first glance, is certainly plausible; yet on closer examination it is open to the following objections:

a) The "steps" or "changes" to which Mr. Burnham refers have all been taken (putting aside for the moment Hungary's brief experience under Imre Nagy) by Communists; presumably, therefore, they have been taken for the ultimate purpose—whatever immediate problem they might be designed to solve—of furthering world revolution. That is to say: when a Communist regime adopts measures (e.g., farm de-collectivization) that modify the social structure over which it presides, it presumably does so with the ultimate purpose of strengthening Communist rule, not of weakening it; and when a Communist regime espouses "national Communism," it presumably does so with the intention of enhancing the long-term prospects of world revolution.

b) In all such instances of "liberalization" and "moves toward national independence," Communists retain control of the situation. So that if the original prognosis regarding the effect of the measure in question turns out to be wrong—*i.e.*, if it turns out to be a "step toward liberation" instead of a means of consolidating or expanding Communist rule, Communists are in a position to jettison that measure, and adopt others. Ultimately, of course, it is the Communists in the Kremlin who retain control of the situation; and they will continue to have control so long as there is no serious danger of Western interference in Communist affairs. To be sure, a Communist regime may be in doubt as to when a given "liberalization" measure ceases to serve Communist ends. Frequently, Communist counsels are divided on precisely that question. Frequently, too, the doubts are resolved in favor of doing nothing, for the time being, to check a trend toward real freedom—and such irresolution may cost Communism, in the short term. But as long as the West leaves them a free hand, Communists *have the power* to prevent things from getting permanently out of hand. Hungary demonstrated that.

c) Therefore, even assuming Titoism gains the upper hand in the Communist world, it cannot be considered

a "step toward liberation" unless, *as a matter of objective fact,* Communists of the Titoist persuasion are wrong as to what is good for Communism, and unless they continue to misjudge the situation right down to the day they are eased out of power. I shall not repeat what I have written before about the likelihood that "national Communists" are right in many of their judgments about what is good for Communism. For my point here is that even if they have heretofore been wrong on all counts, there is every reason to suppose they will see the light before they dig their own graves. The West's decision not to intervene in Eastern Europe gives them just that long. Thus, once again, Mr. Burnham's argument is a victim of the "Eisenhower axioms": as long as they prevail, and because they prevail, Titoism is a snare and a delusion.

The Dimensions of European Power

GERHART NIEMEYER

NATIONAL REVIEW's "great debate" is a "great debate" with a difference, for the two positions are not dictated by mutually irreconcilable objectives. Though sharply opposed, they are rooted in common ground. Both Burnham and Schlamm write out of a will to victory over Communism. Both know that the victory, if ever won, will be won with power; neither, that is to say, thinks that the moral superiority of our cause makes us immune to destruction, or that the inquity of the Soviet system will one day automatically deliver the Red Army into our hands. And both are thinking in terms of victory without total war—*i.e.,* victory achieved by pressures and partial advances that will finally dishearten the enemy and make him ours. Each recognizes the sheer impossibility of our willing an atomic war; both, therefore, seek ways and means of destroying the enemy's will to fight.

Here, however, they begin to disagree. Schlamm would have us impress the Soviets with our superior military might; Burnham asks for a political rollback, based on the determined anti-Communism of the East Europeans. Schlamm would build up German military power within NATO; Burnham would settle for a NATO without Germany provided the Soviet troops withdraw from Eastern Europe. And behind these positions lie conflicting evaluations of at least two factors in the power struggle: 1) Germany's role in the world scene, and 2) the role of NATO military forces in Central Europe.

In Schlamm's view, Germany is the powerhouse of Europe—the one country whose armed might, allied with ours, could conceivably put the fear of God into Soviet hearts. Now: Germany does have a vast military potential; and if Burnham is thus willing to renounce Germany's contribution to NATO, he must feel either that Germany is not likely ever again to realize that potential and re-emerge as a powerhouse, or that the advantages that will accrue from moving the political frontier east will be worth more to us than a German army. The first disagreement, in a word, turns on the question: What, in terms of the current power struggle, is an armed Germany prospectively worth? As for NATO, Schlamm fears that its proposed withdrawal from Germany is tantamount to withdrawal of American troops from all of Europe plus renunciation of the West's middle-sized weapons (that is, its armed forces prepared to offer effective resistance on the spot). We would, he thinks, have nothing left but the Big Bang, which we would never find sufficient cause to touch off. Burnham, as it seems to me, intends neither to withdraw American troops from Europe nor to abandon NATO; but he appears to believe that the Soviets, expecting us to act if and when they invade the neutralized countries, will initiate any showdown with a direct atomic attack on us rather than a conventional attack on Europe.

Germany and NATO

Many considerations must be taken into account in evaluating these two factors. I propose, however, to fix attention on only one of them, leaving the remainder to be canvassed in the continuing debate in NATIONAL REVIEW. If there were reason for confidence in Germany's becoming a military "powerhouse" within NATO at an early moment, I should on the whole favor Schlamm's position (though the issue is not, even on this premise, a simple one). In fact, however, a powerful Germany within the NATO structure is not today within the realm of political probability, and for at least two reasons.

1) All European NATO members have, over the years, progressively scaled down their prospective armaments. In 1950 the goal was 100 divisions. In 1952 it fell to 65 divisions, and in 1954 to thirty-five. Present NATO forces in Europe, *including American forces,* add up to only five divisions. What is still more important, these same countries vie with one another in the attempt to prove that they can't afford armament on a larger scale. This, of course, is another way of saying that further armaments would involve economic sacrifices that they are unwilling to make. And such an attitude makes sense to them not because they do not fear Russia or do not consider defense important, but because they have sloughed off the responsibility for matching Soviet military might onto the United States.

Priorities in European foreign policies, in consequence, have shifted: the Soviet threat, which in 1950, by virtually common consent, topped the priority list, has been displaced by interests of more immediate and particular concern to each nation (in France by rivalry with Germany, and the empire, in Britain by economic objectives, and the empire, etc.). When the French move NATO divisions from Europe to Africa, they

telegraph the fact that NATO's defense purposes now have a lesser claim on their resources than France's rank as a great power in the European system. The threat of a Soviet attack has not disappeared from European minds, but it is offset by a feeling of security that rests on the fact of American might. Europeans—to put the point a little differently—now assume that their short-of-war contribution will make no appreciable difference in the world scale of forces. Their efforts on behalf of NATO are, therefore, likely to remain moderate; and Germany's can hardly be expected to add up to a military "powerhouse."

2) The second reason is peculiar to Germany. In the past, Germany has indeed been considered—correctly—our strongest ally in Europe. Her anti-Communist determination has been, if anything, stronger than that of the United States. Her policy has dovetailed nicely into ours. I believe, however, that this has been due to coincidence not necessity, and that political unity between the U.S. and Germany is less likely from now on. For German policy has hitherto been based on two premises: a) that the main objective, reunification, called for political not military measures; but b) that the most important single asset for political purposes was alliance with the military might of the West. The U.S. and Germany, in short, wanted the same thing; but the U.S. wanted it with an eye to building "positions of strength" *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, while Germany wanted it in order to regain her lost territory.

The events in Hungary must have forced Germany into an agonizing reappraisal of these premises along these lines: Despite six years of organized effort, NATO is still not strong enough to make a dent in the Russian position on Germany. And, what is more important, a subject people without organized leadership has, unaided by the West, forced the Soviet Union to commit a fifth of its army to a time- and energy-consuming campaign of repression, which even now has not succeeded. On both counts, German policy makers must now be preoccupied with measures in which the military might of the West does *not* figure as Germany's main asset. Even if the German government itself sticks to the old premises, there are countless private organizations in Germany that will not do so, and *they* will take the initiative in preparing a more effective Budapest in the enslaved part of the country. Moreover, Germany can be expected to press for a complete de-Communization of East Germany, not mere Titoization. The chances, therefore, of new German policies, at variance with those of the United States, and of Germany's beginning to pursue her objective independently of U.S. leadership, cannot be ignored. And it is difficult to see what political motives would induce Germany to seek, at this time, the role of powerhouse in a defense organization whose leading power has just denounced its two closest allies for using their military forces in defense of their most vital interests.

Four-Way Struggle for Power

So much for the German factor. With respect to the other focus of disagreement between Burnham and Schlamm—the role of NATO's military forces in Central Europe—the answer depends on whether we are to rely for victory on the military factor alone. As long as we do not envisage open and general war, the struggle will be waged, as it has been until now, on several levels. The struggle is indeed a struggle for decisive superiority of power; but both sides have sought power in at least four dimensions, in such manner that a disadvantage in any particular one of the four has not been regarded as a major setback.

The four dimensions are: a) military forces and weapons for intercontinental warfare (including, besides strategic aircraft and missiles, forces for land and sea combat); b) economic potential, both for increasing arms production and adequate wartime production in case of hostilities; c) political support in the rim-lands between the heart-areas (alliance in some cases, economic coordination in other cases, neutralization in still others); d) reputation as a sure winner in the long run (a decisive factor not only for the support sought in the rim-lands, but also maintaining determination and vigor at home). If the solution is not to come from total atomic war, I repeat, we must not expect victory to accrue from decisive advantage in any *one* of those dimensions, but from the combined effect of superiority in all or most of them. This opens up the possibility of making advances against the enemy, none of which would be grave enough, from his point of view, to warrant his triggering the Main Weapon, but the sum of which would eventually erode his position.

Risks in Both Proposals

Much remains to be explored in this direction, and it is hoped that the discussion started by Burnham and Schlamm will go on until the possibilities have all been canvassed. But the following tentative reaction to the arguments to date is perhaps in order:

The loss of our middle-sized weapons (*i.e.*, armed forces standing ready to fight on the spot) would indeed be serious if we could be counted upon to use them—and the atomic bomb as well. But if we are *not* going to back them up with atomic weapons they are bound to be overrun; and, conversely, if we do intend to back them up with atomic weapons, the fear of an atom war will probably keep us from having our local troops fire even when the angry impulse is upon us. Schlamm's insistence on the high importance of a U.S. division in Bavaria should, therefore, be reconsidered in the light of his own argument that we shall be unable, emotionally, to use the atom bomb. Burnham's proposal, on the other hand, does *not* promise ultimate and definite victory. It holds out the prospect of gaining advantages in a situation which, by taking a sudden new turn, has offered us peculiar opportunities. These advantages lie in dimensions of power in which we have so far left all the laurels to the enemy: e.g., that of advance in the rim-lands, and in reputation as a sure winner. His proposal is not without risks; but Schlamm's isn't either. For his rigid insistence on the German powerhouse may leave us minus a European ally *against* our will and expectations; and if it did, we might one day wish that we had willed—and thus foreseen—such a state of affairs.

On with the discussion, gentlemen. Minds are still open.

from WASHINGTON *straight*

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

Round One

With the President's blessing and a cordial nod from the State Department, two Senate Committees (Armed Services and Foreign Relations) will undertake a sweeping review of U.S. policy in the Middle East during the past decade. If there seemed a minimum of Administration resistance to this catch-all inquiry into bipartisan blunders, it may be elucidated by Secretary Dulles' letter to Senator Green: "I understand," said the Secretary, "that the request (for a documented, chronological report) will be so couched that compliance therewith would not delay but presumably expedite action on the pending joint resolution to halt Communist aggression in the Middle East. . . ." The Middle East "study" will not begin until action has been completed on the resolution. From the ringside viewpoint it was a strategic victory for the White House.

"Even the Weariest River . . ."

John Foster Dulles has traveled farther and faster than any Secretary of State in history. Neither age nor illness nor bad weather nor consistent failure has dampened his peripatetic zeal. No wonder Dean Acheson resents him. In the matter of mileage alone, Mr. Dulles makes his predecessor look like a provincial. In the matter of versatility the comparison is odious. Mr. Acheson was just a plodder; he hewed to the pinko line with an unjeweled consistency. Mr. Dulles, in contrast, has been for war (Indo-China), peace (Geneva), war (Formosa), peace at any price *to our allies* (Suez), peaceful coexistence, massive retaliation and agonizing reappraisal! Mr. Acheson never quite got impeached, but during the heyday of his reign there were many cities and towns in America where he would have been as welcome as a rabid coyote. Again a contrast: a few Democratic Senators such as Fulbright, Humphrey, and Joe Clark say "Dulles must go," but there is no threat of impeachment and Mr. Dulles could go safely anywhere in the country with an escort of one tenderfoot Boy Scout. Mr. Dulles' departure from his office will not be precipitated by his critics at home or abroad.

D. Beck v. U. S. Senate

At Miami Beach last week the best minds of the AFL-CIO were able to decipher handwriting on the wall. Whereupon the Executive Council duly affirmed a declaration that any official of a member union invoking the Fifth Amendment "for personal protection" to avoid testifying on union affairs, would be summarily ousted. This directive not only implied ready cooperation with congressional inquiries into union racketeering, but also diverted some of the heat to a fairly promising scapegoat: Dave Beck, Boss of the Teamsters Union. Mr. Beck rose to the challenge—or swallowed the bait as the case may be—by promptly announcing defiance of the Council's new "policy." George Meany, AFL-CIO president, who personally wrote the ouster ultimatum, had a 22 to one majority in the Council. Mr. Meany is well aware that the attempt to kill a Senate investigation by means of a legalistic jurisdictional roadblock has as much chance of success as a popgun against a tank. There is always the alternative of a Select Committee, with comprehensive authority to investigate anything and everything, whenever the rather nominal restrictions on a Standing Committee interfere with the objective.

There is therefore a strong probability that the Senate will name a Select Committee, with Senator McClellan as its chairman. And there is a fair chance that Senator Barry Goldwater will be one of the Republican members. McClellan congratulated Meany on his cooperation. In due time he will no doubt send a message to Beck: a *subpoena duces tecum*. Mr. Beck is a power in the land but so were others before him, who, backed by immense wealth, influence in high places and the best legal talent money could buy, thought they could successfully defy the Senate. Harry Sinclair, for example. Neither his millions, nor his contacts, nor his distinguished legal battalion were of avail when he refused to answer Senators' questions "on advice of counsel." The trial judge remarked that many people were in the cemetery who had followed the advice of their physicians and others were in the penitentiary for accepting the guidance of their attorneys. Then he sent Mr. Sinclair off to jail.

School Aid

Increasing last year's demand by $50 million, Mr. Eisenhower wants Congress to approve a $2 billion federal aid school-program "uncomplicated by provisions dealing with the complex problems of integration." Many experienced legislators believe that the President's request is unrealistic at best. They know, and the President's advisors should, that the ghost of the anti-segregation amendment which defeated the 1956 proposal still haunts the Capitol and is unlikely to be exorcised by the bell, book and candle of the White House.

But No Confetti

The coolness with which Ibn Saud has been received by the public should give the Administration some concern about the plans to roll out the red rug for Tito. An increasing number of Democrats and Republicans in Congress as well as scores of organizations and hundreds of individuals have voiced their protests to the State Department and the White House. So far they have been unavailing. "Honoring" Tito will be something of a chore, no matter how it's rigged.

The THIRD WORLD WAR

JAMES BURNHAM

Communist or Russian?

There is a basic historical question, of profound practical consequence, that has been often and bitterly disputed since 1917. Is the Soviet state structure—initiated through the Bolshevik insurrection in November 1917, consolidated in the Civil War, and enlarged in the aftermath of the Second World War—primarily *Russian* or *Communist?* It is both, of course. But which has priority?

In the years 1917-1920 the Russian Communists established power over most (though not all) of what had formerly been the Russian Empire. This empire had been built by the dynamic expansion of the ethnic Russians starting from the fifteenth century Duchy of Muscovy. By the early twentieth century the empire had spread to the shores of the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas, and half way through Poland to the west. Many nations—Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the three Baltic states, parts of Poland, Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and many more—had been gathered within the imperial whole. Russians and Russia were politically predominant; but Russians numbered only about half of the total population.

In the disintegration of defeat and revolution, the empire fell apart. The separate nations declared their independence. The Communists, however, after seizing power first in Russia, managed to bring most of the other nations (except for the Baltic countries and Poland) back into an imperial structure—the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.

But was this USSR the Russian Empire rechristened? Or was it a wholly new entity, a secular world religion that just happened to win as its first geographical base the territory of the former empire of the Tsars?

Nationalist historians from the smaller nations of the old empire, such as Ukraine and Georgia, have usually argued for the priority of the Russian element. Even in the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire was often called "the prisonhouse of nations." The expansive drive of Russia has been a phenomenon of five centuries, not decades. Long before modern Communism, this territorial expansion was accomplished by "universalistic" ideas: Pan-Slavism, for example, and the idea of Moscow as "the third Rome." Alexis de Tocqueville commented prophetically on the Russian expansive impulse, and Feodor Dostoevsky shared its Pan-Slavic ideology.

Under this interpretation Communism appears as only a modern, probably temporary covering for the centuries-old drive of the Russians toward Eurasian and finally world hegemony.

This point of view is shared by most Balts, East Europeans, and indeed by the majority of Continental Europeans. It is shown linguistically by the persistent use of the terms "Russia" and "Russian" in place of "Soviet Union" and "Soviet" or "Communist." In Budapest last autumn, the painted slogan demanded: "*Russians* Go Home!" In fact, one might almost say that the nearer a nation or people is to Moscow, the more likely it is to see "Russia" rather than "Communism" as its central political problem.

Adherents of the "Russianist" interpretation insist that the history of Soviet expansion bears them out. The Russian Communists, ruling as the Tsars did from the holy Kremlin, pursue the traditional goals of Russian imperial policy: the Baltic to be a Russian lake; control of East Europe and pressure westward; predominance in the development of China; toward warm water ports. The present Mideast push, they say, is precisely in the old Russian line.

It could be added that the accretions to the Soviet sphere have been in the traditional manner of an expanding land empire: in every case the added territory has been immediately contiguous to the home base. Kremlin-ruled Communism has never succeeded in "jumping"—in getting full control over a nation or region that is geographically separated. This latter operation, frequent in the expansion of sea empires, would seem natural for a truly "ideological empire." It has not happened in the case of Soviet Communism.

There is very sharp conflict with the Russianist view, in the first instance from non-Communist Russians. They, like many ex-Communists and many theorists who have specialized in the history and philosophy of Communism, contend that Communism is a world conspiracy based on a total ideology (or secular religion). This conspiracy first overran Russia, and thus must take Russian geography into account for its further moves, but it might just as well have first conquered Britain (as Marx expected) or Germany. The central problem is Communism, not the Russian Empire.

It is quite possible that the truth fuses these two interpretations: "Sovietism" is both Communist and Russian; universalistic by origin, ideology and to some degree in method of operation, but Russian by the historical conjuncture that brought it to power first in Russia.

One might then hold that the relative weight of the two elements shifts from time to time, with now one and then the other predominant. Plainly, it was more as Russian than as Communist that Moscow fought the war against Hitler, just as it was more Communist than Russian when it abolished the laws of biology.

For the past year a paradoxical trend can be observed. The Soviet Union is Communist in its relation to the underdeveloped nations, but more and more Russian in its relation to Europe (including the captive nations of East Europe) and to the West generally. This may be why the official Communist parties of the Western nations have been losing strength so rapidly, and why the *form* of the East European revolt against Moscow is anti-Russian rather than inclusively anti-Communist.

Timetable to Disaster

In a chronological review of recent foreign policy the well-known Newsweek columnist demonstrates the bankruptcy that led to the Eisenhower Doctrine

HENRY HAZLITT

The new "Eisenhower Doctrine" is a proposal to do belatedly, and under grave handicaps of his own making, what the President deliberately refused to do when the prospect of success was brightest. His proposed new policy is a confession of the bankruptcy of his previous policy. It is in one major respect a complete about-face. In the very midst of the Suez crisis he declared that he could not "conceive of military force being a good solution" to the problem. At last he is able to conceive this. But his present proposal to resort to force if need be is hedged about with so many ambiguities and restrictions that it seems likely to prove as ineffective as the policy he pursued until a few days before his January 5 message.

Nothing shows more clearly than a chronological review of events, and of our government's actions or failure to act regarding them, how President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles consistently missed their opportunities, consistently thwarted Britain and France, and consistently (though of course unknowingly) let themselves be used as pawns in the game being played by Nasser and the rulers of Russia.

As the Pawns Were Moved

Most of the events listed below are taken from news stories which appeared on the front page of the *New York Times*. For the most part they are stated in the language used in the news stories themselves. My own occasional comment is in parentheses.

July 26—Nasser announced Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal under a nationalization decree. (Our main effort was devoted, not to denouncing this act as a breach of treaty and of international law, but to restraining the "hotheads" of Britain and France.)

Aug. 1—Britain, France and the U.S. held high-level talks in London and proposed a 24-nation conference.

Aug. 16—Representatives of 22 nations opened discussion of the Suez crisis in London. Egypt and Greece refused invitations to participate.

Aug. 26—Nasser agreed to receive a visit from a five-nation committee which wanted to present conciliatory proposals.

Aug. 29—Eisenhower appealed for world-wide support of the conference proposals, "which, fully respecting the sovereignty of Egypt, would assure a peaceful solution of this great problem."

Sept. 9—Negotiations in Cairo between the five-nation committee and Nasser ended in failure after Nasser spurned the proposal for international control of the canal.

Sept. 19-21—Representatives of the 18 nations that had united on the August proposal for international control of the canal met in London and drafted a tentative plan for a Suez Canal Users Association "to facilitate any steps which may lead to a final or provisional solution of the Suez Canal problem."

Oct. 10—It was reported from London that Secretary Dulles had become "the whipping boy for the [British] national feeling of frustration over the Suez Crisis and a focus for rising anti-Americanism."

Oct. 24—It was reported that Soviet armed might had quelled bloody anti-Russian rioting in Budapest.

Oct. 25—(Mr. Eisenhower did not at first seem to feel that this required any special call on the UN, or any other action.) "The United States," said the President, "deplores the intervention of Soviet military forces."

Oct. 27—Britain, France and the United States did call for action by the UN Security Council on the Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary.

Oct. 28—The Security Council, 9 to 1, put the Hungarian question on its agenda.

Oct. 29—An Israeli military force thrust into the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, and reached within twenty miles of the Suez Canal.

Oct. 30—President Eisenhower sent "a vigorous and emphatic protest" to Britain and France against their ultimatum to Egypt and called on them to reconsider. (There had been no similar vigorous and emphatic protest to Nasser against his seizure of the Suez Canal.)

Oct. 30—The Soviet Union announced its willingness to examine the whole matter of Soviet troops stationed in satellite countries. As a first step, it said, it had ordered withdrawal of its forces from Budapest.

Oct. 31—British and French troop-carrying aircraft and landing craft were reported moving South toward Egypt from Cyprus, for an invasion of the Suez Canal zone.

Oct. 31 — President Eisenhower made a television and radio broadcast to the nation on the Mideast crisis. He declared: "We took our first measure in this action yesterday. We went to the United Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to their own line and that hostilities in the area be brought to a close. This proposal was not adopted because it was vetoed by Great Britain and by France. It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before the United Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear." (This procedure had not occurred to him in connection either with Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal, or Soviet Russia's intervention in Hungary.)

Oct. 31—The Security Council called an emergency session of the General Assembly of the UN to make recommendations on the "action undertaken against Egypt." (No rec-

ommendations were asked for on the action undertaken against Hungary.)

Nov. 2—A U.S. proposal for a cease-fire in the Egyptian fighting was approved at an emergency session of the General Assembly by a vote of 64 to 5. The U.S. voted with Egypt and Soviet Russia against Britain, France and Israel.

Nov. 2—Two Soviet tank divisions were reported advancing on Budapest. The Western powers called an emergency meeting of the Security Council and called on the UN to take measures against Soviet military action in Hungary.

Nov. 3—John Foster Dulles underwent an operation.

Nov. 4—The General Assembly of the UN voted to ask the Secretary General to submit a plan for creation of a UN police force to obtain and supervise a cease-fire in the Middle East. The policing proposal was adopted 57 to 0. Israel, France and Britain were among the 19 states that abstained. (This proposal was not combined with any proposal for a UN police force in Budapest.)

Nov. 5—Eight Soviet divisions, seven of them armored, and squadron after squadron of bombers, overwhelmed the revolution in Budapest against Soviet domination in its twelfth day. Premier Nagy was taken prisoner.

Nov. 5—British and French forces invaded Egypt. The General Assembly of the UN voted to create an international UN force to supervise cessation of fighting in the Middle East. Britain announced that she and France would cease all military action against Egypt as soon as the Israeli and Egyptian governments signified acceptance of the UN plan for an international police force.

Nov. 5—A White House statement declared, in answer to Premier Bulganin's proposal that the U.S. and the Soviet Union jointly intervene to halt the invasion of Egypt: "Neither Soviet nor any other military forces should now enter the Middle East area except under UN mandate." (At no point, however, did the White House say that the U.S. would use its own armed forces to oppose a Soviet invasion of the Middle East.)

Nov. 6—Nineteen Asian and African countries in the UN demanded that British, French and Israeli military forces get out of Egypt immediately. (No mention of Soviet forces in Hungary.)

Nov. 6—Russian "volunteers," according to the Moscow radio, began applying for service with the Egyptian armed forces.

Nov. 7—The General Assembly of the UN again called upon Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their troops from Egypt immediately. The resolution was adopted 65 to 1, Israel voting against, Britain and France abstaining. The United States once more voted with Egypt and the USSR.

Nov. 7—Mr. Eisenhower sent a cablegram to David Ben-Gurion, Premier of Israel, urging him to comply with the UN resolution. (No cablegram to Bulganin about Soviet troops in Hungary.)

Nov. 8—Soviet troops broke through the last pockets of resistance in Budapest. Israel agreed to withdraw her troops from Egypt as soon as "satisfactory arrangements" were made about the proposed UN police force.

Nov. 9—President Eisenhower and his top advisers gave congressional leaders a review of the Middle-Eastern and European situations. "It was understood that the review gave a non-alarming picture. . . . The President was said to have felt . . . there was hope of a settlement in the Middle East. It was further understood that no new U.S. policies had been discussed because none were regarded as needed at the moment."

Nov. 10—The Soviet Union said it would permit "volunteers" to go to Egypt to fight "aggressors" if Britain, France and Israel refused to withdraw their forces from Egyptian territory.

Nov. 10—The Moscow broadcast threatening that Soviet "volunteers" might go to Egypt was reported to be disturbing French officials. "The first question asked was what President Eisenhower would do to prevent such intervention. . . . The conviction has grown that Britain and France . . . are incapable, without the active backing of the United States, of fending off the Soviet threats."

Nov. 10—"President Eisenhower paid a flying visit to his Gettysburg, Pa. farm today, tramping happily about the place and inspecting his livestock."

Nov. 11—The *New York Times* pointed out in a news article: "At stake in the Suez Canal crisis are the fantastic oil riches of the Middle East. Important as that inland waterway is, it is of small consequence as compared with the petroleum deposits that underlie the desert sands of the region. At present these vast oil resources are held by the free world. But the hold is not firm. Situated just South of the Russian border, these oil-rich nations offer good opportunities for Communist penetration."

Nov. 12—The Egyptian ambassador to Moscow announced that more than 50,000 Soviet citizens had "volunteered" to serve with Egyptian forces.

Nov. 12—Hungary's puppet government rejected a request that it admit UN observers.

Nov. 15—Advance units of the UN police force arrived in the Suez Canal zone.

Nov. 16—Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary of State, declared in the General Assembly of the UN that "The United *Nations* would be obliged to take action" if Soviet "volunteers" were sent to the Middle East. (He threw no light on what the United States itself would do.)

Nov. 15—In Paris, Harold Macmillan of Britain urged the immediate creation of a trans-Atlantic petroleum organization to plan at once to supply oil to West Europe in view of the Suez Canal crisis.

Nov. 17—The United States was urged by Britain and France to make clear that it was behind Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold of the UN in his efforts to keep the UN police force in the Suez Canal zone long enough to encourage negotiations for a general settlement of political problems in the Middle East.

Nov. 17—Speaking at a meeting in London, Sir Anthony Eden warned that the free world cannot avert war by adopting a policy of peace at any price: "Surely it was never the intention that, if the United Nations could not act, its members should not be allowed to take action to protect the interests of peace itself. . . . If we renounce the use of force when law cannot command order, then we are in fact undermining the rule of law. We are leaving the world open to the lawbreakers."

Nov. 19—James Reston, on the front page of the *New York Times*, noted "an interesting and significant change" in the U.S. diplomacy, marked by:

"But Gentlemen, you must help us repair the damage done by our friends the Russians."

1) "A greater emphasis on working through the United Nations." 2) "A marked decline of public emphasis on force as a deterrent to Communist aggression." 3) "A new emphasis on working with the rising nationalistic forces of Asia, the Middle East and Africa." 4) "A greater independence from Britain and France. . . ."

Nov. 20—UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold called on Britain, France and Israel to explain their failure to withdraw their forces from Egypt in compliance with the General Assembly cease-fire resolution.

Nov. 21—It was announced that Prime Minister Eden, suffering from overstrain as result of the Middle-East crisis, was flying to Jamaica.

Nov. 23—Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Britain, France and Israel from Egypt. He was supported by members of the Asian, African and Soviet bloc and by Panama. (It still didn't seem to occur to the United States, or even to French, British or Israeli representatives, to suggest that they withdraw their forces at the same rate as Soviet Russia withdraw its forces from Hungary and other satellites.)

Nov. 24—The General Assembly of the UN called on Britain, France and Israel to withdraw their forces from Egypt "forthwith." The resolution was carried 63 to 5, with 10 abstentions. The United States once more joined with the Soviet Union and Asian-African blocs in the majority for the resolution.

Nov. 27—President Eisenhower asserted that the Suez crisis had not weakened or disrupted the British-French-United States alliance or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (A statement apparently based on the theory that words speak louder than actions.)

Nov. 28—Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd of Great Britain declared that the "acute difference" between Britain and the United States on policy on the Middle East remained unsettled.

Dec. 2—President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles agreed that the prospects for peace in the Middle East had improved considerably.

Dec. 3—British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd announced that Britain and France would withdraw their troops from Egypt without further delay. The British spokesman expressed the hope that in return the UN would proceed to the immediate clearance of the Suez Canal and would support untrammeled transit through the waterway.

Dec. 5—Selwyn Lloyd charged in the House of Commons that it was failure of the UN to keep the peace in the Middle East that led to British and French intervention in Egypt.

Dec. 12—The General Assembly, 55 to 8, condemned the Soviet intervention in Hungary. (The UN did not, however, see fit to suggest that Russian troops withdraw from Hungary and be replaced by UN forces to conduct a free election.)

Jan. 5—President Eisenhower asked Congress to authorize him to use the armed forces of the United States against any Communist or Communist-dominated aggressor in the Middle East area.

A Blank Check—for the UN

Thus the President has come around to asking for discretion to use the military force that he had previously declared to be "inconceivable." He has not, however, proposed a *complete* reversal of policy. He has not proposed that Britain, France and Israel be allowed to return to Egypt unless there is an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary and from every other satellite nation where they are not wanted. He has not asked simply for a congressional resolution that the vital interests of the United States require the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East and that, if necessary, and under the authority of Congress, American forces will be used to prevent aggression. On the contrary, his proposed resolution, while it would make it unnecessary for the President to consult Congress further, would still seem to make it necessary for him at each step to consult the United Nations. The employment of force is to be "consonant with the . . . actions and recommendations of the United Nations." This means that the UN could once more frustrate our freedom of action as it did in Korea.

This proposal to continue to consult the UN, to abide by its future "recommendations," and to continue to give it a veto over any action we may propose in the Middle East, removes the last vestige of excuse for asking Congress to sign a blank check abdicating its own constitutional right to be consulted or to withhold consent.

(Reprints of Mr. Hazlitt's article are available from NATIONAL REVIEW, *211 East 37th St., New York 16, N.Y., at 10 for $2.00, 100 for $10.00.)*

The PRINTED Word

Crimes and Punishments

The Liberal Propaganda Machine's chesty and obstreperous *New York Post* did the following through the four-day period January 23-26:

—Sardonically exploited the Mad Bomber's arrest for purposes of Liberal *haute politique*: "Rational man has once again routed the forces of darkness . . . the kiddies may go to sleep; the grownups are already in dreamland."

—Liked Senator Lehman's proposal for annual Democratic conventions: ". . . bold . . . lively . . . The Democrats were handicapped throughout the last election because they had failed in Congress to make any clear case against . . . Eisenhower. . . . They could not do in six weeks what the Johnson-Rayburn leadership had failed to do in four years. An annual Party conference would force the Democrats to confront the present condition of futility . . . Lehman says: 'The opposition party has a responsibility to represent constantly in the public mind a clear alternative to the party in power. The choice must be clear.'"

—Gave Dave Beck a piece of its mind about his union's refusal to divulge information concerning its finances to the Senate Investigating Committee: ". . . Senate sleuths [do] show far more zeal for [investigating] labor malpractices than [for] exploring the . . . oil lobby. But that is no excuse for the game of hide-and-seek being played by Beck's boys. They discredit . . . all organized labor."

—Had at Mr. Eisenhower for his press-conference replies to questions about 1) a petition from Negro leaders in Montgomery, requesting Presidential support against pro-segregationist violence, 2) the State Department's ban on American correspondents' going to China, and 3) Adlai Stevenson's charge that H-Bomb tests were kept up for political reasons during the Presidential campaign: "[The President said] . . . the point had been turned over to the Department of Justice. . . . [It] is sad to watch the President of the U.S. respond to a petition for moral leadership by announcing that he has turned the matter over to his lawyer. . . . [The] President said: '. . . as long as any power unjustly and improperly holds prisoners of ours . . . then it is something with which I will have nothing to do. . . . Until there is some change in that regard, I wouldn't consider changing that policy, myself.' . . . Ike has officially accepted the Dulles doctrine that the State Dept. will henceforth regulate the assignments of American journalists. . . . Under this theory newspapermen . . . become pawns of government. [He] voices a widespread national sentiment when he protests the continued imprisonment . . . But the force of his protest is diminished and degraded when he uses their plight as an excuse for crude totalitarian curbs on . . . American newspapermen . . . [The President] leaves unanswered the question: Did the Administration pigeonhole plans to abandon the H-bomb tests simply because Stevenson publicly advocated that program? Why does the Administration refuse to talk about well-founded reports that the tests have been stopped since Election Day? Is the subject . . . unfit for free discussion in a democracy?"

—Went roughly one mile out of its way, apropos King Saud's visit, to smear John O'Donnell of the *News*: ". . . . The *Post* herewith . . . [nominates] O'Donnell as chairman of Washington's welcoming committee for King Saud. . . . [He] has exhibited a sympathy for Saud's . . . oppression and prejudice that is clearly above and beyond the call of duty. Rarely has O'Donnell shown so much understanding since . . . he spotted . . . Hitler as a misunderstood man. . . . If America must welcome Saud, let O'Donnell head the parade. He cares."

—Echoed (without credit) NATIONAL REVIEW opinion on Dulles and current U.S. foreign policy: ". . . the record of Dulles' diplomacy . . . is one of failure and futility, of contradiction and confusion . . . [His] slogan . . . [is] 'trust the President' . . . Nothing in recent Middle Eastern history justifies [it] . . . both the President and Dulles have demanded a blank check for a bankrupt diplomacy."

—Went roughly two miles out of its way to needle the House Committee on Un-American Activities: "With . . . the U.S. Communist Party [disintegrating], . . . the future becomes . . . precarious for such agencies as the . . . Committee . . . Moscow's self-revelations and the ruthless Russian onslaught in Hungary have shattered the faith of the most fanatic Bolsheviks . . . [rendering] increasingly grotesque the business of picturing the battered U.S. Communist corps as a clear and present danger to the survival of the republic. . . . What, then, remains for . . . the House Committee? Part of the answer is in the committee's new 'Revised Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications' . . . [which lists] the defunct Progressive Party. Thus does the Committee announce that if it cannot find enough live Communist bodies . . . it will resurrect the dead. . . . This is vindictive, pointless boondoggling in a political graveyard."

—Denounced Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon Johnson for "protecting the Eisenhower Administration from Democratic—and democratic—examination": ". . . Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, and Morse have been endeavoring to force full, free discussion of the new Middle East Doctrine. They have contended that the country is entitled to a real review of Mr. Dulles' diplomatic debacles. . . . But just as the debate had begun to get interesting, Mr. Johnson . . . announced that he saw no reason for delaying action . . . to permit a genuine review . . . Johnson's systematic tendency [is] to abdicate the role of Democratic leader and serve as ideological bodyguard for the Administration. . . . Fulbright and his associates have asked questions that reflect widespread uncertainty . . . and the panic with which Mr. Dulles has responded to it strengthens the suspicion that the hidden story is a big story."

It does at that. W. K.

Principles and Heresies

FRANK S. MEYER

The Ethics of Mr. Eisenhower's Rhetoric

Some years ago in *The Ethics of Rhetoric,* one of the few wise books by a contemporary I have had the fortune to find, Richard Weaver wrote: "An ethics of rhetoric requires that ultimate terms be ultimate in some rational sense." As I read Mr. Eisenhower's Inaugural Address, with its insistent repetition of such terms as Justice, Law, Freedom, and as I tried to divine what these words could mean to the man who had so recently acted at Suez and failed to act in Hungary, I was forcibly reminded of that sentence of Mr. Weaver's.

These are ultimate terms, words uttered to gain our consent and acceptance by the power of the intricate set of associations they conjure up. The weight of the entire address, with its noble-sounding periods and self-conscious pieties, rests heavily upon them. But are they used ethically, that is to say, with responsibility, so that in their context and under existing circumstances they direct us to a coherent and morally supportable set of attitudes and actions? Or are they, like the tetragrammaton of the black magician and the demagogic slogan of the totalitarian leader, but talismanic incantations, intended to secure our assent not to the high purpose which the words connote, but to other and different policies? Are they, in Mr. Weaver's words, "ultimate in some rational sense"? That is to say, when Mr. Eisenhower speaks of "justice" in international affairs, does he accept the rational implications of the term? Is his structure of belief and policy and action such as to be coherent with its inherent meaning?

To answer these questions should not be too difficult, for—fortunately for our examination of his rhetoric—Mr. Eisenhower is not a private man, the coherence of whose structure of belief and action may only very occasionally be rigidly tested. He is at the head of the most powerful nation on earth, and he has been faced repeatedly, in full view of the world, with the need both to express his beliefs and to act upon them.

"There must," he says, "be justice sensed and shared by all peoples; for, without justice, the world can know only a tense and unstable truce." This is a clear enough statement. Do Mr. Eisenhower's other pronouncements and his actions accord with it so that together they form a unified rational structure?

In the first place, Mr. Eisenhower has made it abundantly clear that he regards war as the absolute evil—and that without qualification. Therefore it follows inescapably that peace is the absolute good—and *that* without qualification. Justice, therefore, on any coherent analysis, must be purely a secondary matter.

And if it be thought too abstract to base my criticism upon this logical contradiction, consider some of his more concrete words and acts. He has continuously, as in this very address, subordinated the objectives of the United States, moral as well as material, and its power to realize them, to the claims and authority of the United Nations.

Now the United Nations can in practice mean one of two things: the power of the Security Council or the power of the General Assembly. If it means the Council, where are the claims of justice, when subject to the veto of the Soviet Union, which by its philosophical outlook denies the very possibility of all non-materialist concepts, justice included?

If it means the Assembly, then also what is the fate of justice, at the mercy of the shifting intrigues of blocs and counter-blocs of states unequal in power, disparate in culture, some understanding and some ignorant of the very concept of justice? With power totally unproportionate to responsibility, with the vote of Libya or Luxembourg lying in the balance with equal weight to that of the United States or the United Kingdom, what becomes of justice, however pleasing such a situation may be to the ideologues of "equality"?

Again, Mr. Eisenhower would agree, one assumes, that the Soviet Union represents the epitome of injustice. What, then, does justice mean to him, when he moves against France and England in defense of Moscow's puppet, Nasser, and stands by while Hungary is murdered? How does it square with devotion to justice to woo Tito and Gomulka, whose system of thought and government, in its fundamentals identical with that of the Soviet Union, is as alien to justice as ever was Stalin's?

A policy based upon the coexistence of justice and injustice, under some higher law of peace at any price, is intrinsically incompatible with the principle of justice. As an ultimate term it has no rational foundation. It is a useful device to gain support for a program, but that program is not a program of justice. The appeal to justice is a moral sham.

And so it is with others of his ultimate terms. Law, for example. "There must be," says Mr. Eisenhower, "law, steadily invoked and respected by all nations . . ." But there can be no approach to world-wide law, even in the smallest things, until the Communist power center, which recognizes no law but power, is destroyed. Yet Mr. Eisenhower by word and deed has made it unmistakably clear that he will do nothing to bring that about. He can reasonably believe in coexistence, or he can reasonably believe in law—but not both at the same time. Of the two, it is certain from his actions to which he is committed.

And freedom? The only meaning Mr. Eisenhower can give to the word is "freedom from grinding poverty," world-wide material well-being, to be brought about by a world WPA. Meanwhile, the Hungarians live in Communist slavery (Kadar-type) and the Poles in Communist slavery (Gomulka-type), and for the Russian people Mr. Eisenhower holds out the hope of "greater security before their own [Communist] laws."

Freedom, Law, Justice: how hollow the words must ring in the gutted streets of Budapest—if anyone in Budapest still bothers to listen to the Voice of America. I have questioned, analytically, the ethics of Mr. Eisenhower's rhetorical terms; but the final proof was there, where they were tested in acid and found counterfeit.

THE IVORY TOWER

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.

The Financial Predicament of Higher Education
John Doe, B.A., Must Pay His Bills—(End)

There is, then, no use in fooling ourselves: higher education will be paid for, directly or indirectly, either by the government (*i.e.*, by the total taxpaying population) or by the individual beneficiaries of that education. There is no one else, in an age where Medici are excluded; and therefore other "solutions" are essentially illusory.

If higher education is to escape collectivization, the relationship between a private college and its students must be clarified. The first step, I should think, is to remind the public that four years of college is not—to use the accountant's terminology—a prolonged act of consumption, but a capital investment. That much is obvious. A college education yields substantial returns, tangible and intangible, throughout one's lifetime. Now very few people can put down the money with which to make any substantial capital investment. That a father cannot pay the full price of a college education, down, does not mean that his son should not go to college; but neither does it mean that he should expect others to pay the cost of his going to college. There are creditors in the world we live in; and they can be useful in allaying the financial predicament of higher education.

Down in Spartanburg, South Carolina, a middle-sized Baptist college has approached the problem directly. Bob Jones University charges its students exactly what it costs to feed, lodge, and educate them in the manner the college's trustees deem appropriate. The university awards no scholarships: but it does extend credit—as much as the student needs. The student pays what he can; for the balance, he signs an interest-bearing note. The college turns the note over to a local bank, and borrows on it for current expenses. Payments on the note are made by the alumnus over the years. The incidence of default is negligible.

The figures vary a great deal from college to college. But let us take College X, with an enrollment of five thousand students and a budget of $20 million. College X is taking in $8 million from its students, and gets $7 million from its endowment fund. It is left beating the bushes for another $5 million. The proposal is that every student be asked to pay any part of an additional thousand dollars, and sign a note for the balance. A student who elects to borrow the entire amount every year for four years, would owe College X four thousand dollars plus interest. This sum he would repay over the next twenty years, according to a schedule that reflected a sympathetic concern for the financial hardships of the early years after graduation. The average annual payment would be three hundred dollars. The student should be required to insure his life in the amount borrowed, naming the college as beneficiary. That debt, endorsed by a parent if required by law, would though unsecured, be an obligation both moral and legal. (A warning: the plan would not reasonably apply to graduate students, except perhaps in some professional schools. Students in most schools of advanced study must be subsidized. The existing scale of philanthropy can easily take care of that problem.)

It's the Alumni in Any Case

In what sense, when you come down to it, does this plan differ from imposing upon the alumni at large the burden, year after year, of sustaining a college? President Whitney Griswold's most recent report on the agonized condition of his university called upon Yale alumni to give more money to Yale, *much* more money, and not just *this* year, but *next* year and the year after, and *every* year, sempiternally. If Yale alumni are to pay the bills out of a sense of duty to Yale—and that, not charity so much, is the sense to which, quite rightly, the pitch is increasingly keyed—why not formalize the relationship of creditor-debtor?

The lengths to which the beleaguered colleges and universities of this country are being driven in order to raise money is scandalous. The crisis invites hypocrisy, and the use of techniques that are downright obnoxious. The relationship of the modern college with its alumni is structured on elaborately worked out formulae for maximizing the yield of the annual, or semiannual, foray for money. There is hardly a phase of alumni relations untouched by the question of money. I have here, from my own university, a list of every member of my class who gave money to Yale last year. I know of no conceivable reason why this list should be sent to me other than to titillate an uncommendable curiosity on my part as to who did and who didn't; and to serve as a weapon of light blackmail upon those who didn't. I know of a college that a while back gave an elaborate testimonial dinner in honor of a tyrannical old misanthrope heartily detested by everyone he came into contact with in that college, at which oleaginous panegyrics were delivered upon his dessicated heart: because the old codger was (rightly) reckoned about due to die, and the college stood to figure in his will. I know a college—I ask you to believe me—which has appointed an old gentleman of irreproachable refinement to write "out of impulse," to freshly bereaved widows, to say how much everyone will miss old Harry and to mention, in passing, that dear, loyal Harry surely meant to mention our alma mater in his will, but all of us have a way of forgetting things . . . —a gesture about as spontaneous as a wrestler's yelp of pain . . . But I have said enough. The situation is desperately unhealthy. It must be organically reorganized.

(Reprints including all three of Mr. Buckley's columns on the financial predicament of higher education are available at 25¢ each, 10 for $2.00, 100 for $10.00.)

ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

Toscanini: An Essay in Greatness

Toscanini's life was a continuous essay in greatness. To call him the most tasteful musician of his age; or the conductor who most loyally executed the intent of the composer; or the maestro with an unmatchable faculty of forcing perfection upon an orchestra; all these compliments are untenable. For all this Toscanini was not. His true achievement as an artist was his own life. He turned it into a rare piece of art—one coherent act of testimony to the supreme importance of music.

The axiomatic claims of the redundant superlatives popularly attached to Toscanini's name are manifestly wrong. One read, for instance, in every obituary that Toscanini's performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony (the last of Toscanini's titanic undertakings) was the realization nearest to Beethoven's intent. This, to a musician, is of course idle and absurd talk. As a composer could never express his intent outside the context of his composition, to define the intent of a musical phrase extra-musically is a vice of sterile philistinism. No one can responsibly say that Toscanini's interpretation of the Ninth Symphony most closely approximated Beethoven's musical or even philosophical ideas. All a serious critic of music can responsibly say is that he liked Toscanini's interpretation better than, say, Weingartner's.

It is simply untrue that Toscanini was such a violently devoted defender of his masters' integrity. Shortly before he died he made an infinitely moving confession: that, to him, Beethoven was the ultimate meaning and the final measure of music. And yet, Toscanini dared what much lesser devotion would have recoiled from daring: he took a movement from a Beethoven string quartet and "transcribed" it for string orchestra! Naturally it was a flop. On the whole, Beethoven knew what he was doing; and if he decided that the proper use of a given musical material was in a string quartet, chances are that he was right. A minimum of fidelity to Beethoven, one would think, would have prevented a musician from an absurd attempt to improve on him. Yet Toscanini, with an altogether disarming innocence, did just that.

Nor does it make sense to coin superlatives about Toscanini's taste. Taste, in fact, was the least developed of his faculties. His programming, for one thing, was positively atrocious —and surely a conductor is nowhere as much his tasteful self as in the premeditated selection of the music he proposes to evoke in the sequence of one evening. Toscanini has been known to conduct, in *one* evening, Mozart and Wagner and Sousa. Now I do not say that one who loves Mozart cannot also love Wagner and Sousa. But to conduct, in one throw, Mozart and Wagner and Sousa indicates a voracious but somewhat undiscriminating appetite for music.

There is truth in the universal recollection that no conductor in Toscanini's lifetime could match the perfectionist magic of this lovable sorcerer. He was visibly charged with a dynamic force that gripped the orchestra no less than the audience. I don't think an orchestra played necessarily *better* under Toscanini than under, say, Bruno Walter. On the contrary, I remember performances of mediocre orchestras that were transfigured by Mr. Walter's delicate musicianship into a kind of perfection which Toscanini never attained and, I suspect, never desired. For Bruno Walter, at least in the case of Mozart, has no greater wish than to *vanish* into that heaven; and so he disappears—and there is Mozart. Toscanini never meant to vanish. He meant to *emerge*. He was, in spite of all his precision, in the true romantic tradition. He was, I believe, the legitimate heir to Franz Liszt—the Promethean Maestro, the heroic conductor who reaches for the sky, not to ascend to heaven, but to bring heaven down to earth.

This was Toscanini's greatness. He conducted his music, and his affairs, as if he were a monarch—as if he were Toscanini himself. He had the flair for the enormous gesture; and this alone, in our puny and dehydrated world, would have constituted greatness. But, in his case, that flair for the grand gesture had grown from Toscanini's identification with music. To him, music was a sovereign power, as sovereign and as powerful as any empire; and, having mystically assumed the rule in the mighty realm of music, he was going to get for it due diplomatic recognition among the other powers of the world.

His articulated political opinions were always decent, and usually childish. With an artist's haste to respond to ideas viscerally rather than with his brains Toscanini fell for many a fellow traveler in his day; and never noticed his mistake. The reason for this was, quite simply, that he just wouldn't bother with such irrelevant contexts as the rational meaning or the social consequences or the scheming implications of an idea. What mattered supremely was how it sounded—its acoustic effect, as it were. This, in other cases, would have been irresponsible preciousness; in Toscanini's it reflected the quality of a man whose very genius was to move through life with the egocentric self-assurance of a storm.

In truth he treated all ideas with indifference and even contempt. He responded to passions and colors, not to ideas and nuances. He was, in this sense, the most Italian of all musicians, and we shall never again hear Verdi as wholly fulfilled as in Toscanini's presence. He had enough self-comprehension to be insecure with Mozart and Bach. He was, to the last breath, obsessed with the titanism of Beethoven, Wagner and (God forgive him) Tchaikovsky.

He was, all in all, the last survivor of the age of titanism—an age that had style, though little taste, an age that believed in *élan vital* (Shaw's "life force"), though not much in God. Goethe, on the threshold of that age, once wrote: "Only bums are modest." Toscanini was not modest. He took the world by its ears and made it listen to music. His music was not great. But he was. The essence of his greatness was his certainty, never shaken, that man was born to hear music. And so he was.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

No Saltless Pumpkin

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

As the late Dean Gauss of Princeton stands revealed in a posthumous *The Papers of Christian Gauss,* edited by his daughter Katherine Gauss Jackson and Hiram Haydn (Random House, $6.00), the man is a little hard to pin down. In literature he was something of an eclectic (though he disliked the cynicism of books like Ben Hecht's *Erik Dorn*); in philosophy he described himself facetiously as an Integralist; in politics he would have called himself a democrat (small d), an internationalist and a liberal, words which cover a multitude of confusions. But in spite of a certain lack of intellectual contour and definition Dean Gauss had something that is as necessary as it is rare in an educator. That "something" was the ability to spot the possibility of excellence in a student, plus the strong desire to nurse the excellence along without putting it into leading strings that kill the sense of self-reliant experiment.

Dean Gauss' particular quality comes out most strongly in the long section of his papers given over to "Correspondence with F. Scott Fitzgerald and Edmund Wilson." With Fitzgerald he seems to have had a sort of semi-indulgent relationship; he deplored some of the more obstreperous manifestations of Fitzgerald's energy, but was afraid that if "Scott" were to become a soberly responsible citizen his work would lose the "charm and excitement" that derived from "a childish (no adverse implication) sense for the wonder of the world." He hoped that Fitzgerald could some day develop an ironic view of the "Long Island nincompoops" who disported in such books as *The Great Gatsby,* but he would never have urged the cultivation of such a view to the extent of interfering with Fitzgerald's "sense for the significant detail, the rhythmically concordant phrase and sensuous connotations of imagery."

In the case of Edmund Wilson, Dean Gauss had a little less of the "hands off" attitude during the long years of a remarkable epistolary relationship. Wilson, whose whole intellectual biography is in these letters, sent his articles and books in proof sheet to his old teacher, and he frequently asked for advice in Dean Gauss' own specialized field of Romance language literature. Though Gauss never tried to force anything down Wilson's throat, he would hint periodically that socialism was no cure-all for modern ills and that religion was more fundamental than economics and politics. Wilson ignored the hints, but he developed his own critical method by taking Dean Gauss' remarkable lectures on such figures as Flaubert, Taine and Anatole France (seven of which are included in the *Papers*) for his models. Gauss was no worshipper of facts as such, but he believed in conveying plenty of historical and personal information, plus narration of what an author's books were about, before coming down hard on the subject of significance. No doubt Edmund Wilson's own excellence at turning an account of the genesis of an author's ideas into first-rate narrative is grounded in his native make-up and ability. But Gauss obviously helped direct Wilson's feet toward the most suitable path quite early in their relationship as teacher and hungry student.

Dean Gauss had a snorting dislike for what he called *zucche senza sale,* or the "saltless pumpkins." He labored to make his students into something that would be more than pushpin replicas of a dominant Princeton type. For fully half of his forty years at Princeton he was in charge of dealing out disciplinary measures in his capacity of Dean of Undergraduates. He did this without incurring enmities. As a young man he had had a hot temper, not always under good control. But he mastered this temper long before he began dealing with the effects of juvenile temper in others. He liked sports, particularly football; he liked to laugh; and he manifestly loved justice. Since he remained young himself, he was in rapport with his surroundings. He had the natural influence that comes from a combination of self-mastery and an outgoing sympathy for everything that makes a person an individual. Boys would go to Princeton because of its supposed country-club flavor, its "atmosphere of bright colors" (to use a Scott Fitzgerald quote). They would emerge from Professor Gauss' courses on French literature with some notion that there was more to life than bright colors and the nineteenth hole.

Dean Gauss had a somewhat uncritical desire to keep up with certain phases of "modernity" as exemplified in Woodrow Wilson's politics and economics. He blamed the ills of his native Middle West on "finance capitalism," or, as he preferred to call it, "absentee industrialism." One wonders what he would have made, if he had lived, of the recent drive of modern Big Industry to decentralize itself, to sift responsibility for local action back down the line to local agents in local communities. One wonders, also, if he would have been critical of the Big Union's attempt to centralize all dealings with management, even to the extent of making Industry-wide Bargaining compulsory in law. Dean Gauss inferentially reproved Edmund Wilson for thinking that the American Middle West could ever go Communist. But he himself failed to see how fluid and protean our own industrial society can be in its response to its

special problems of size, control and distribution.

As to Dean Gauss' wholly uncritical "internationalism," it would seem to have derived from the world of his Ann Arbor, Michigan, boyhood. His father, a Wuerttemburger, had left Germany because of the growing dominance of the Prussians in the time of Bismarck. Dean Gauss naturally associated "nationalism" with Prussian compulsion. There is no hint in his papers that he ever grasped the difference between a nationalism built on Western federative principles, with the individual constituting a firm check on the government, and the type of thing he abhorred in the autocracies of Central Europe.

But politics was not, after all, Dean Gauss' specialty. His province was the inner life of man as it is reflected in literature. What stands out in his papers is his hatred of cynicism, of the deadly sin of *accidie*, or boredom. His long letter to an unnamed undergraduate about the Younger Generation of the twenties remains a remarkably apt document in the fifties. And his touchstone for education—he speaks of persuading "teachers to approach history and literature, in fact, all subjects, from the direction that really produced greatness"—is the true touchstone, provided, of course, one has the proper sense in the first place of what true greatness is.

King of Oberlin

Henry Churchill King of Oberlin, by Donald M. Love. 300 pp. New Haven, Yale University Press. $4.50

Oberlin College was a very radical institution in its beginning, founded to advance the causes of Abolition and Feminism. What sober citizens—or even jovial citizens—thought of that college, in the fifties, is sufficiently suggested by Artemus Ward in his episode "Oberlin": "The College opens with a prayer and then the New York *Tribune* is read." Mr. Love speaks of "the genius of the old Oberlin—to those who understand it a source of strength and confidence, and to those who do not 'an astonishment and a hissing.'" Artemus Ward and your servant are among the unenlightened.

But when Henry Churchill King was student, professor and president at Oberlin, during the final quarter of the last century and the first quarter of this, Oberlin, lacking any particular Cause to agitate for, had to content itself simply with being a very good college. President King, one of the old theologically-trained American college presidents, was a man of strong mind and lofty character, and he had much to do with Oberlin's enduring reputation. The cast of his mind may be suggested by the following passage from his article "The Rigor of the Nature of Things," published when he had just become a tutor at a salary of four hundred dollars a year:

> Take Mephistopheles from the Faust of Goethe; take Satan from Paradise Lost; take from Shakespere "the sharp lightning of conscience"—that so-called "figment of a diseased brain" and "creature of education"; take away the "thunderclaps of justice"—so offensive to our tenderhearted humanitarians—and doubtless you may yet have the fitful April shower of some lover's tift; but there will be no terrific storms, without which there is no power; there will be no Shakespere, no Milton, no Goethe; and, more than this, there is no such conception, no nature, no fidelity to human life.

We could use some young tutors nowadays with such sentiments and style—and, for that matter, some college presidents.

Mr. Love's book is a highly intelligent contribution to the history of the higher learning in America. The brief description of King's studies in Berlin in 1893 was of especial interest to this reviewer. At that time there were more than 1,300 American students at the free University of Berlin—then, as now, governed by a program and a spirit "as free as possible from the blight of dictatorship."

And here is the curriculum of the freshman year at Oberlin in 1877, when King enrolled. First term: Livy, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, Greek Prose Composition, Algebra. Second term: Horace, Lysias, Greek Prose Composition, Solid and Spherical Geometry. Third term: Cicero's *De Senectute*, Herodotus, German, Plane and Spherical Geometry. Such a course of studies produced a great many gentlemen and scholars of high talents. I should like to think that today's curriculum achieves the same results *in re* the education of governors; but I don't think anything of the sort. RUSSELL KIRK

Scalps and Poetry

A Pictorial History of The American Indian, by Oliver La Farge. 272 pp. Illustrated. New York. Crown Publishers. $7.50

The story of the American Indians, told here with a profusion of pictures and a spare—if adequate—text, is at once a proud history, cruel and tragic.

Mr. La Farge convinces you that many of the tribes were on the verge of civilization when the white man arrived, first to give impetus to this process, then disrupt it, and finally to destroy it. And today, unscrupulous white men, sometimes in unholy alliance with the government, scheme still to strip some tribes of what little is left of their reservations after a century of broken faith.

It is not a gentle story. There are some moments of beauty, of honor pledged and faith kept; but these are rare. Most of the beauty in this history belongs to the "savages," proud people like the Seminoles who have never yet been conquered by the United States and are today fiercely independent of government paternalism.

The logic of the situation, of course, was imprescriptable. The white men came to carve out a new life in a new continent. They were millions against one million; and the natives, during the few years when power rested with them, were either guileless enough to be friendly or too disorganized to offer effective resistance.

This is not to say that they were the aboriginal savages (some were) of pioneer tales; many Indians lived better, enjoyed more liberty and had a spiritually more complete life than European serfs of the time. But it was natural for the frontiersman to detest his enemy. It was made easy to do so by the Indian's almost ritualistic love of torture—although some of these pioneers could not have been strangers altogether to cruelty.

They were not savages—not all of them—but they were not all of them the Noble Red Man either. Early

settlers were deeply impressed by the political democracy some tribes practiced. They carried tales back to Europe, and the whole thing got confused with the child-of-nature romance. "The influence of the first observations on the Indians can be traced through the French philosophers to the English, and with it went the concept of 'government by consent of the governed.' "

Mr. La Farge loves his Indians, does not proselytize. Each tribe is preciously individual to him. If he is humorless, his is not a humorous subject. I think he will make you lament—as I did—our continuing shabby treatment of the Indian, which in many cases still offers the curious alternative of: be slaves *and* starve.

F. R. BUCKLEY

Grasshopper-Hero

The Field of Vision, by Wright Morris. 251 pp. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. $3.50

The story of the Ant and the Grasshopper, as we all know, was recorded by a not wholly unprejudiced Ant, called Aesop, and his smug account of the Grasshopper's comeuppance omitted any mention of the embittered envy he must have always felt for his enemy's heedlessness. For, as someone observes in Wright Morris' new novel, "There's nothing the world loves so much as a goddam fool."

The Field of Vision does not retell Aesop's fable, but it does explore, poetically and probingly, the same antagonism in human nature. Boyd is the grasshopper-hero who always leaps before he looks; the crazy kid who once tore a pocket from Ty Cobb's pants, and loved to walk along the railroad tracks near the gypsy camps, hoping to be kidnapped. McKee is his sober pal, "the witness without whom there would not have been a hero."

As they grew up, Boyd went off to New York to dabble in the theater and feel an increasing sense of having missed his boat; McKee stayed at home in Nebraska, to marry the girl Boyd kissed first and become her good provider. Years later, the three of them meet at a bullfight in Mexico City, and there, as they watch the stylized patterns of human risk and parry on the sanded ring, their own lives comes into harsh focus. McKee's wife knows that only Boyd's kiss has ever given her goosepimples. Boyd realizes that, at middle-age, his status is that of an "unemployed Hero," and that the moment he ripped off Ty Cobb's pocket was probably his finest hour. And poor McKee, when the bullfight is over, fiercely stops at a tourist booth outside the ring and buys himself a large pair of authentic horns.

ROGER BECKET

To order any book reviewed in this book section, write:

THE BOOKMAILER
Box 101, Murray Hill Station
New York 16, N. Y.

Return mail service—postpaid
PAY ONLY BOOKSTORE PRICE

$.....payment enclosed

Please send me: .....
(name of book)

.....

.....

Name .....

Address .....

.....

(No C.O.D. orders accepted; payment MUST accompany order. N.Y. City residents add 3% tax.)

Of Psychic Powers

Far Memory, the autobiography of Joan Grant. 272 pp. New York: Harper and Brothers. $3.50

This autobiography covers Mrs. Grant's life from infancy to the publication of her first novel. The career which she describes differs significantly from that of other women of her age and class only in her claim to psychic powers and experiences which will provide a new thrill for the devotees of Bridey Murphy.

Without questioning Mrs. Grant's sincerity we may note that with only eight exceptions the experiences which she regards as psychic do not differ generically from the experiences of imaginative children and creative artists. The former frequently believe that they have playmates invisible to adults; the latter while at work often identify themselves with the creation of their fancy and find that many of their most brilliant conceptions appear suddenly in their conscious minds as fully formed products of the mysterious process that is usually called inspiration.

Of the eight exceptions that I mentioned, seven conform closely to the type of experience recorded by J. W. Dunne in his *Experiment with Time* (1927). Visions of past, contemporary, or future events which could not be known by ordinary means to the seer, and were verified by subsequent news or investigation, are frequently recorded from the earliest literature to the present day. They form a most impressive total, but when each is considered separately its cogency depends on our confidence in the accuracy and veracity of the narrator. None is *per se* more convincing than George Eliot's *Lifted Veil* and similar works of fiction.

In addition to the seven instances of "second sight," Mrs. Grant reports that by undressing and then invoking unidentified deities she was able to produce rain in the desert. (For this also there are many precedents.)

According to Mrs. Grant, her seven historical novels are really autobiographies, records of her experiences in earlier lives. We may grant that her novels are not comparable to Flaubert's *Salammbo,* which was the product of diligent research supplemented by an artistic intuition that at several points anticipated later discoveries; instead, they pose essentially the same question as the novels that were supposedly dictated to Mrs. John H. Curran by the ghost of Patience Worth. The mind and soul of man are mysteries that modern psychology has ignored rather than studied; and since we call natural that which is explicable in terms of physical law, the existence of preternatural phenomena cannot be doubted. Mrs. Grant shares one of the oldest and most nearly universal beliefs of mankind, and the materialist who denies the possibility of metempsychosis convicts himself of a bigoted and woeful ignorance of scientific method.

If Mrs. Grant's book serves only to remind us that, whatever our opinion of her accuracy and veracity, her claims cannot be disproved, it has its value. I regret only that neither her psychic powers nor her publisher's readers were able to save her from numerous and offensive errors in diction and syntax.

REVILO OLIVER

To the Editor

Mr. Burnham's Article

Impressive

I think Mr. Burnham's article ["Liberation: What Next?", January 19] is the most impressive article I have ever read.

Pelham, N.Y. ARTHUR EGAN

The Soviets Won't Leave Germany

James Burnham advanced a thesis that, given our present semi-paralyzed leadership, we ought now to concentrate on "helping" the Soviet Union get out of Eastern Europe. ". . . it is by no means improbable that the Kremlin would like to get its troops out, if it could find a workable formula for doing so," he wrote.

It is suggested that Mr. Burnham, in making this assumption, has failed to take into account—or at any rate to mention—a military factor of the highest importance, namely: *uranium*. The Soviets are known to be mining uranium in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. The intensity with which they have worked these mines may well indicate that Eastern Europe is their main source of fissionable material.

If this is so, wild horses, much less political bait, could not budge Soviet troops out of these satellite countries.

MONTGOMERY M. GREEN
Havre De Grace, Md.

As one who is moved by great affection toward James Burnham and the other editors of NATIONAL REVIEW, I am tremulously interfering in their current Great Debate. As follows:

Modest Proposal No. 1: Let us withdraw our troops from West Germany and agree to its neutralization on condition that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from East Germany and the Eastern European satellites. (Mr. Burnham's suggestion.)

Modest Proposal No. 2: Let us withdraw our forces from Europe, Asia and Africa on condition that Khrushchev, Bulganin and the CPUSSR relinquish control of Russia, call for and permit free elections, and compel the Communist parties of Eastern Europe to do likewise. (My own suggestion.)

Mr. Burnham's proposal, admittedly, is more modest than my own. It would lead to the collapse of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe and the return of the satellite nations to independence. The result would be the breakup of the Molotov Plan on which the current Soviet economy is based, economic chaos in Russia, and the very real possibility of an end to Communism in that tragic country. My proposal would do the job much more cleanly, quickly and efficiently.

There is only one catch to both plans. Neither the "collective leadership" nor the CPUSSR has shown the slightest inclination to commit suicide. In point of fact, they have shown a far greater will to live than any so far exhibited by the Western world. Khrushchev, Bulganin & Co. would sooner elect Mr. Burnham and Mr. Buckley to the Central Committee of the CPUSSR than they would withdraw from Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the Great Debate makes no sense. . . .

Washington, D.C. RALPH DE TOLEDANO

Eisenhower Axioms Preclude Victory

. . . Since Mr. Burnham's is at least an intelligent voice, I should like to have him answer one question: When the Soviet Union breaks the agreement (in the unlikely event it should make an agreement), what *then* do we do, given the "Eisenhower axioms," which preclude the use of force and are "part of the reality of our time"?

New York City ELIZABETH MERRITT

. . . This type of "middle-of-the-roadism" seems logical. But can we assume that "soft non-Communists" are anti-Communist? Forrestal and McCarthy gave us much evidence to the contrary.

If the "motley crew" behind the scenes in Washington is committed to stimulating rather than deterring Soviet expansion, it is useless even to extend proposals for a Communist defeat, particularly one that might work.

Philadelphia, Pa. WILLIAM T. MULLIGAN

Helplessness of a Neutral Nation

With all respect for James Burnham's competent and comprehensive knowledge of Communist strategy and tactics, his suggestion of German unification through neutralization seems unrealistic to me. It seems to be based on the false premise that Soviet agreements can be trusted. It would turn Germany into a geopolitical vacuum and render her as helpless as Denmark was at the beginning of World War II. The Kremlin should welcome this opportunity to deprive Western European defense of its strongest Continental contingent and at the right moment would no doubt send its tank divisions on a little two-day junket all across Germany.

New York City FELIX WITTMER

[*Further letters on articles in the "Great Debate" will be published in future issues.* THE EDITORS]

Dixieland Blues

J. P. McFadden's review of "The Heart of Jazz" [January 5] was excellent. Being fond of Dixieland music, I have read a good many books which consider the subject. The one referred to is the first that I have seen which actually considers this music from the point of view of what it is: deeply sentimental and wonderfully melodious. Moderns do not like it, of course, just as they hate anything which is traditional, or older than yesterday. Since in their lexicon anything which is different must be considered progress, modern desecration of traditional music becomes "advanced" and thereby good.

St. Petersburg, Fla. ROBERT J. NEEDLES

Signalling a Right-Hand Turn

I was a happy Republican before I read NATIONAL REVIEW: My grandfather was a happy Republican—very proud of his party. Didn't they have those darn Liberals in his day?

And now, as I wend my way happily down the middle-of-the-road, please watch out for me—they make these fenders thinner than they did in Grandfather's day.

New York City DOROTHY LARSON